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The Minority Game (MG), the Majority Game (MAJG) and the Dollar Game ($G) are 
important and closely-related versions of market-entry games designed to model different 
features of real-world financial markets. In a variant of these games, agents measure the 
performance of their available strategies over a fixed-length rolling window of prior time-
steps. These are the so-called Time Horizon MG/MAJG/$G (THMG, THMAJG, 
TH$G)s. Their probabilistic dynamics may be completely characterized in Markov-chain 
formulation. Games of both the standard and TH variants generate time-series that may 
be understood as arising from a stochastically perturbed determinism because a coin toss 
is used to break ties. The average over the binomially-distributed coin-tosses yields the 
underlying determinism. In order to quantify the degree of this determinism and of 
higher-order perturbations, we decompose the sign of the time-series they generate 
(analogous to a market price time series) into a superposition of weighted Hamiltonian 
cycles on graphs—exactly in the TH variants and approximately in the standard versions. 
The cycle decomposition also provides a “dissection” of the internal dynamics of the 
games and a quantitative measure of the degree of determinism. We discuss how the 
outperformance of strategies relative to agents in the THMG—the “illusion of control”—
and the reverse in the THMAJG and TH$G, i.e., genuine control—may be understood on 
a cycle-by-cycle basis. The decomposition offers as well a new metric for comparing 
different game dynamics to real-world financial time-series and a method for generating 
predictors. We apply the cycle predictor a real-world market, with significantly positive 
returns for the latter. 
 
1. OVERVIEW 
The Minority Game (MG), the Majority Game (MAJG) and the Dollar Game ($G) are 
multi-agent games in which agents make binary decisions in an attempt to maximize their 
individual gain at each time-step. Their decisions represent a response to the summed 
state of all agents’ prior decisions. In the MG agents attempt to make the same decision 
as a minority of all other agents. In the MAJG and $G agents attempt to make the same 
decision as the majority of all other agents. (The distinction between MAJG and $G is in 
how agents’ gain is computed as detailed below.)  
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The MG, MAJG and $G are all pure versions of market-entry games. They have 
attracted keen interest in the physics, economics and optimization communities—
especially the MG because of its intrinsic frustration, multiple equilibria and similarity to 
multi-body spin systems.  
When past information is limited to a rolling window of prior states of fixed length τ , 
the MG, MAJG and $G may all be expressed in Markov-chain formulation [1-3]. (These 
are the “time-horizon” variants of the games: THMG, THMAJG, TH$G.) If a standard 
game reaches its steady-state in 'τ  steps, its dynamics are equivalent to its TH variant 
with window length 'τ .  
Here, we present a new use of a cycle decomposition method that expresses the 
inherently probabilistic nature of a Markov chain as an exact superposition of 
deterministic sequences, extending ideas discussed in [4]. The nature of the underlying 
series and/or deterministic cycles is related in complex fashion to the degree of 
“persistence” or of “anti-persistence” they display: “Persistence” is a quantitative 
measure of the tendency of patterns in a time-series to be followed by repetitions of that 
same pattern. Similarly, “anti-persistence” is a measure of the tendency of patterns to be 
followed rather by their respective inverses. (Exact definitions and procedures for 
obtaining these measures follow). On the unit interval perfect persistence  may be 
defined as “1” and perfect anti-persistence as “0” with random sequences having  = 
0.5. 
P
P
Ultimately, these games are meant to illuminate the behavior of real-world financial 
markets and the time-series they generate. Analyses of both cycles and persistence shed 
light on real-life financial time series, in particular on their departures from randomness. 
An important question that has been addressed sporadically is whether the light shed by 
studies of these games may be translated into methods applicable to, for example, the 
prediction of real-world time-series. We provide an example of how insights derived 
from these games may indeed be translated into real-world prediction methods. We do so 
by constructing a predictor based on a decomposition of the time-series into weighted 
deterministic cycles on graphs and by quantifying the degree of persistence or anti-
persistence in our target series. For pedagogical purposes we here demonstrate only “toy” 
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predictors of great simplicity. However, these methods may be readily generalized and 
improved, opening up new avenues for research and application, for instance, by 
encoding price-change histories in trinary or even more detailed form. The cycle 
decomposition method for such higher-order matrices is significantly more complex, 
however. 
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In this paper we present six findings and/or related applications:  
First, as presented in full detail in [3], we note that for the two games employing the 
majority rule (MAJG, $G), A(t) (the binary time series generated by agents in the 
aggregate) is persistent ( ), approaching the random limit asymptotically with 
increasing memory length m (i.e., 
0.5>P
lim 0.5
m→∞ =P
0.5
); in minority games the time series crosses 
from anti-persistent for  (cm m< <P ) to persistent ( ) at the well-known phase 
transition, attains a maximum and then declines asymptotically to ( ) with further 
increasing m. 
0.5>P
0.5P =
Second, we demonstrate how the time series generated by the THMG, THMAJG and 
TH$G (all of which are Markovian processes) may be exactly represented as a weighted 
superposition of deterministic cycles on graphs. 
Third, a decomposition of the respective series into such cycles on graphs reveals in 
highly intuitive fashion characteristic differences among the three types of games. These 
differences in cycle structure are consistent with, but further differentiate, the distinction 
between persistent and anti-persistent series. 
Fourth, we apply the cycle decomposition method to the prediction of game-generated 
time-series, based on a sliding window of past information. 
Fifth, all three types of game-generated time-series as well as real world series may be 
reformulated as perturbations of a characteristic underlying dynamic that to the zeroth 
order is wholly deterministic. I.e., any binary time series may be decomposed into a 
superposition of wholly deterministic Hamiltonian cycles on graphs.  The cycle of 
greatest weight may be considered the dominant underlying determinism; cycles of lesser 
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weight may be thought of as the higher-order perturbations. Probabilistic transitions from 
one history to another are in this view recast as probabilistic transitions among cycles. 
This cycle decomposition approach parallels the theories of dynamics systems and of 
deterministic chaos [5] in particular on the one hand and of quantum chaos [6] on the 
other hand, both based on the decomposition on unstable periodic orbits. 
Sixth is the application of the cycle decomposition method and an analysis of 
persistence to real-life financial time series: Different series (or the same series in 
different periods) may be characterized by a signature cycle structure and/or degree of 
persistence. This fact leads to prediction methods based on cycles and on persistence, 
even for time-series which are not in fact Markovian. 
2.1 PERSISTENCE VERSUS ANTI-PERSISTENCE IN THE MG, MAJG 
AND $G 
Within a long binary string, consider a possible sub-sequence of length 'm . Examining 
the string from one end to the other, compute the number of times that, when the sub-
sequence is followed by the digit 1, the next appearance of the sub-sequence is followed 
by the digit 0. Tally this as one instance of “anti-persistence”. (If the sub-sequence is 
again followed by 1, tally one instance of “persistence”). Re-examine and tally the string 
in the same way for all possible subsequences of length m. Then the overall proportion of 
persistent tallies is the strings’ “persistence” at scale m; 1 minus its persistence is the 
series’ anti-persistence at scale m.   
Among other features to be discussed later and previously discussed in detail in [3] 
Figure 1 illustrates that in terms of degree of persistence , P $min maj< <P P P . This holds 
true for all memory lengths ' in the respective games and (to be explained later, as also 
in ref. [3]) at the natural scale at which the persistence is measured. (I.e., the set of 
patterns being examined in a series for repetition is determined by a bit-length 'm , and 
the size of that set grows as . It is both convenient and natural to set when 
analyzing persistence in the MG, MAJG and $G, where m is the known bit-length of the 
history accessible to the games’ agents at each time-step). 
m
m 2' 'm = m
Figure 1 also illustrates that 
the variability in persistence differs from game to game and for the MG by phase. 
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Consistent with the fact that for cm m<  the time-series itself is highly variable from run 
to run and much less so for , the variability in persistence from run to run likewise 
changes at the phase transition. Consistent with it high degree of persistence, there is little 
variability altogether for the MAJG. The variability in  for the $G is roughly consistent 
throughout and much greater than for the MAJG. 
cmm ≥
P
Persistence/Anti-Persistence in the MG, JG and $G
-0.5
0.0
0.5
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 MA
min maj $
P
 
Figure 1: Persistence and anti-persistence in MG, MAJG and $G for 'm m= , 100 runs of 1000 time steps 
for each game, at each Error bars show 1 SD (barely visible at this scale for the MAJG).   'm m=
2.2 CYCLE STRUCTURE OF THE MG, MAJG AND $G 
We may also compare MG, MAJG and $G in terms of the decomposition of the binary 
time-series they generate into Hamiltonian cycles on graphs (at some given length 'm ). 
To do this, we first encode a binary series, i.e. as its decimal equivalent +1 given length 
'  (a rolling window). For example, at '=2: m m
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
{ } { }
0,1,1,1,0,0,1,0, 0,1 , 1,1 , 1,1 , 1,0 , 0,0 , 0,1 , 1,0
1,3,3,2,0,1,2 1 2,4,4,3,1,2,3
→
→ + =
… …
… …
 (1) 
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 The allowed transitions from one 'm -bit state to the next form a complete binary de 
Bruijn graph of order '=2 as shown in the middle graphic of m Figure 2. (examples of 
complete de Bruijn graphs of order ' 1m =  and ' 3m = are shown to the left and right 
respectively). 
 
Figure 2: Complete binary de Bruijn graphs of orders 1, 2 and 3 from left to right. The vertices may be 
numbered as shown or by their decimal equivalents +1. In a complete graph, all possible states and 
transitions are represented. 
If a binary sequence thus encoded touches no vertex more than once except upon 
returning to the first, the sequence is considered a cycle. Figure 3 shows the cycle 
consisting of the last four digits in (1). The four digits are represented as three vertices 
(and the “edges” connecting them) because the last digit (vertex) repeats the first. 
 
Figure 3: Binary de Bruijn graph for ' 2m = showing only the cycle consisting of the last four states of (1)
. 
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We demonstrate in detail that (and how) any sequence may be decomposed into a 
weighted superposition of such cycles, unique for each 'm . Each cycle represents a 
different deterministic binary-state process, implicit in the fact that no state in such a 
cycle can be reached by, nor may it transition to, more than one other state. In the most 
general non-cyclic binary process, every 'm -bit state may be reached from two preceding 
states and may transition to two. This follows from the fact that all transitions may be 
considered as the motion of a sliding window along the binary string: One digit is 
dropped at the beginning, one is added at the end. Given a state at time t, the state at time 
t+1 can end in only two possible states: the one ending in 0 or the one ending in 1. The 
converse is true as well reading the string in reverse order, hence any given state can be 
reached by two preceding ones. In ternary series, each state may transition to one of three 
possible states and may likewise be reached by three, and so on for higher bases.   
Suppose a binary series represents transitions from one state to the next that are  
probabilistic. When a probabilistic process is decomposed into deterministic cycles, the 
transition probabilities between states are recast as transition probabilities among cycles 
at those states common to more than one cycle. 
2.3 CYCLE DISTINCTIONS AMONG MG, MAJG AND $G 
We here emphasize one of our important observations, namely, that just as the MG, 
MAJ and $G are distinct in terms of the persistence demonstrated by the time-series they 
generate; they are distinct as well in terms of their cycle structure. 
Figure 4 illustrates the typical weighting of cycles in the MG, MAJG and $G for m=4, 
'=2, relative to the expected weighting in a completely random binary sequence. Bars 
in gray represent cycle weights in excess of the random expectation value normalized to 
1; bars in black represent cycle weights less than 1. 
m
 7
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MAJG Cycle Decomposition
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$G Cycle Decomposition
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Figure 4: Relative weighting of cycles in the MG, MAJG and $G at m’=2 for m=mc=4, N=31, S=2 
expressed as a fraction/multiple of the expected weighting (normalized to 1) of a cycle decomposition 
of a completely random binary sequence 
There are many potential way of both characterizing and applying such a “taxonomy” 
of series. One simple metric is the pseudo-Euclidian distance between the cycle 
decomposition of a given series and that for a completely random series, providing a 
measure of non-randomness. Taken exactly, such a measure presumes that cycles in a 
decomposition are orthonormal and they are not. But by normalizing the weights to 1 for 
a random series we get a somewhat better if still imprecise definition of “distance”. 
Presuming orthogonality, this distance d is simply: 
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1
k
game j
j
d w
=
= ∑  (2) 
As is evident from the absolute values of the distance from zero of each of the bars in 
Figure 4, , i.e., the MAJG generates series that 
are, by this measure, the least random; the MG generates series that are closest to 
random. (A more exact use of this metric would require characterizing a series at many, 
theoretically all, .) The same relationship among the three games are illustrated in 
$0.270 0.133 0.028maj mind d d= > = > =
'm
Figure 1 with respect to persistence and anti-persistence: While the MG is anti-persistent 
and the MAJG and $Gs are persistent, the MG is closest to , the random limit, the 
MAJG farthest. 
0.5P =
Intuitively it might seem at first that anti-persistent sequences are less predictable than 
persistent sequences (from the perspective of an outside observer able to analyze a past 
history of arbitrary length). But in fact, the formal definition of persistence means that 
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anti-persistent sequences of a given measure are as deterministic as persistent 
sequences of that same measure—so long as the 'm  at which persistence is measured is 
consistent throughout. What 
P 
cle decomposition should yield the best 
ty o three game types by this test stand in the same relationship to one 
Figure 4 illustrates at a glance is that the overall departure 
from randomness of the MAJG and $G is greater than for the MG and that the MAJG 
departs somewhat more from randomness than the $G. On this basis we expect, and in 
fact find, that a prediction method based on a cy
results for the MAJG and $G relative to the MG. 
2.4 CYCLE-BASED PREDICTORS FOR MG, MAJG AND $G 
We create a toy predictor (details are in Section 5.4) and apply it to all three games, 
pretending that the sequences they return are actual market price-changes. We find that 
for the MG at 'm =2, the percent of correct predictions using a cycle-decomposition 
predictor is ~65%; for the MAJG the percent is ~72% and the $G ~66%. Thus the 
predictabili f the 
another as gamed and gameP . 
2.5 APPROXIMATION OF A SERIES AS A PERTURBED DOMINANT 
CYCLE 
As discussed in ref. [3], the THMG, THMAJ and TH$G may all be expressed 
analytically in the form of Markovian transition matrices. If these matrices are then 
decomposed into a weighted superposition of deterministic cycles, then the most heavily 
weighted cycle may be considered a zeroth order approximation for the entire matrix. (In 
the limit of small m and τ , it may often happen that more than one cycle has the same, 
largest weight; these may be linked or disjoint.) tailed in refs. [1,3] and below, the 
transition matrices for these games arises out of 
As de
( )UN t , the expression for the number of 
agents at timestep t whose contribution to the collective state ( )A t  needs to be 
determined by a coin toss (because their S strategies have accum d the same number 
of points but would yield at leas  differing predictions), and
ulat
t two
e
( )DA t , the expression for 
the contribution to the value of ( )A t that is wholly determined, contingent only upon the 
parti  quenched disorder initializing the game and the particular “path history” at t, cular
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i.e., ( )tμ . A path-history is simply the union of the m-bit binary history at t  (which we 
denote as tμ ) and the preceding τ -bit rolling window over which agent and strategy 
sco
ion 
res are maintained.  
An agent’s contribut to ( )A t will be determined when all of its strategies make the 
same prediction given ( )tμ . (This is more likely the smaller the value o i.e., the fewer 
the number of strategies per agent).  will happen only for some (μ
f S, 
This if an agent’s 
str r, but o e
)t
ategies for all f cours  ( )t diffe μ they happen to be identical.  
Now, ( ) ( ) ( )D UA t A t A t= + , where
 if 
( )UA t is the sum of all agent’s co tions 
determined by an unbiased coin-toss. For certain 
ntribu
( )tμ  the absolute value of  ( )DA t  may 
ugh (a sufficient proportion of agents contributing t so that 
( ) ( )U D
be o large eno it) 
A t A t< —even if all the remaining agents (the number of which = ( )UN t pen 
to vote the same wa e a  generate the maximum possible ( )UA t . In 
, ( )Sgn A t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ =
) hap
y by chanc
es
nd therefore
these instanc ( )DSgn A t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , i.e., the contribution to the series 
( ) ( )1t tμ μ→ + will be determined and that step in the series is therefore deterministic. 
In terms of a transition matrix for a binary series, the entries representing the two 
transition probabilities from a given state to each of two possible successor states will 
consist of 1 and 0, implying that the transitions are either present or absent with certainty 
(i.e., wholly determined). In fact, as we will detail shortly, the dominant cycle in a 
position of a Markovian transition matrix arises directly from the expression for 
( )DA t , excluding the term ( )UN t . I
decom
ts weight is therefore a direct m ree 
of 
easure of the deg
determinism present in the series. 
A transition  matrix presumes that a series is in fact Markovian. Series generated by 
the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G truly are. But the series generated by their non-TH 
variants, the MG, MAJG and $G proper are effectively Markovian only at equilibrium, 
and with intractably large matrices—the window of past information grows without 
bound and becomes equivalent to a sliding window only when very remote information 
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no longer has an effect. However, as discussed in ref. [3], a very high-dimensional 
Markovian series may be approximated by a series of much lower dimension, capturing 
at least some of the information of the full matrix. Likewise may non-Markovian process 
be approximated, in a fashion similar to the use of hidden Markov models in which a 
more complex process is approximated by a hidden switching between two different 
Markovian processes [7][8]. (Indeed, the cycle decomposition method may be considered 
a s
e of hidden determinism in the series as evidenced, for instance by the 
cre
ailable data. Success or failure of a 
ides a 
useful heuristic for the degree of data-preservation. 
to analyze the different performance characteristics of the predictor and relate it 
to f p
decomposition for each fourth of the series is presented later.) The cycle with weight 
implification of the hidden Markov method in which the “switching” occurs among 
multiple deterministic matrices instead of between two probabilistic ones.) 
The information contained in such an approximate transition matrix may be captured 
by analysis of a large window of preceding history. An efficient way of doing so is to 
create a cycle decomposition from this empirical data. If cycles emerge that are not 
merely somewhat but significantly weightier than all the others, one may hypothesize a 
significant degre
ation of predictors that successfully employ the weightiest element(s) of the 
decomposition. 
Note, too, that in converting a continuously-valued (but time-discrete) series to a 
binary series, we are severely compressing the av
cycle-decomposition predictor in the teeth of real-world transaction costs prov
2.6 CYCLE-BASED PREDICTORS FOR THE NASDAQ COMPOSITE 
Finally, we examine a major real-world financial series in these same terms, the 
NASDAQ composite (IXIC) over its entire history. We also examine the index divided in 
quarters 
varying degrees o ersistence. We also incorporate a persistence filter with improved 
results.  
We find that at 'm =2, the overall degree of persistence of the IXIC is ~0.52, thus 
somewhat persistent like the series from the MAJG and $G and contrary to the MG. Its 
cycle decomposition (again over its entire history) is shown in Figure 5. (The cycle 
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closest to zero is the last, Hamiltonian cycle { }1,2,4,3,1 . The one-step persistent cycles 
{ }1,1  and { }4,4 er-represented relative are ov m series and the one-step anti- to a rando
persistent cycle { }2,3,2 is under-represented.  
We thus have a snapshot that suggests a somewhat predictable because somewhat 
persistent time series. ( ly anti-persistent cycle, the last, is present with the 
lowest weight.) With 0.118IXICd = , the IXIC departs from rand
The perfect
omness by this cycle 
dway between that of the measure to an extent mi MG and the $G. 
81, 1< 8 <4, 4 8 <2, 3, 2 8 <1, 2, 3, 1 8 <2, 4, 3, 2 8 <1, 2, 4, 3, 1
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
81, 1< 84, 4< 82, 3, 2<
IXIC at m'
81, 2, 3, 1<
2=
82, 4, 3, 2< 81, 2, 4, 3, 1<
 
Fig
Feb
ure 5: Cycle decomposition of the entire binary history of the NASDAQ composite index (IXIC) from  
ruary, 1971 through January, 2008.   
From the over-representation in the IXIC of the two one-step persistent cycles one 
may guess informally at a simple strategy that has in fact been widely employed to trade 
the IXIC, namely the one-step Martingale: If the previous day’s change in price is 
positive, buy (go long or hold); if negative, sell (or go short). Over the entire nearly 
10,000 day history of the IXIC this strategy yields 58% correct directional guesses 
(which needs to be compared to a net upward drift over the history of 56% up days). This 
small degree of excess predictability, however, yields an annualized return of 38% per 
year (exclusive of transaction costs) versus a “buy and hold” return of 9% per year.. 
However, at 50 basis points per “round-trip” transaction (i.e., 50/10000 = .005 cost per 
unit value traded), the Martingale strategy would have yielded an annualized return of 
~7%, more than 22% less than the buy and hold return of ~9%  A significant amount of 
information has nonetheless been detected by the Martingale strategy, but not enough to 
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be of practical use—the predictor is highly inefficient, obtaining large gains at the cost of 
many changes in strategy direction. Clearly, insufficient information has been recovered 
from the binary-compressed price-change series to compensate for the cost of applying 
tha
 
ov
y 
tha
 trading days using this 
me
 by P
t information. 
An explicit hidden (switching) Markov model of tick data used to generate a predictor 
for foreign exchange rates [9] yielded similar results: While significant theoretical 
predictability was obtained for the USD/CHF exchange rate, it was insufficient to
ercome transaction costs, a common problem that plagues financial market predictors. 
We do better by building a more precise (if still “toy”) predictor based on the same 
cycle-decomposition for the IXIC index (NASDAQ composite; Figure 5), taking into 
account the entire cycle structure (in a simple way to be described) and again obtain a 
correct prediction percentage of 58% versus 56% up. The excess predictability in this 
case yields an annualized return of 0.36 versus the “buy and hold” return of 0.08—
slightly worse than the Martingale predictor. However, returns remain superior to “buy 
and hold” for “round-trip” transaction costs of up to 50 basis points. Thus, the cycle 
predictor extracts information from the compressed binary time-series more efficientl
n does the Martingale predictor—enough to warrant potential real world application. 
Like most real-world series, the IXIC goes through periods of varying P (as measured 
over some time-scale). For example, we expect and find that during periods of low 
volatility as measured by proxy using the VIX (Chicago Board of Trade Volatility Index 
for the NASDAQ 100), the IXIC shows P > 0.5, while during periods of high volatility, P 
> 0.5. Furthermore, if recent past periods (50 trading days) of anti-persistence (P < 0.45) 
are excluded (no market exposure on such days, either long or short), the returns 
(annualized over days of market exposure) rises to 0.38 (equivalent to the Martingale 
predictor) and remain superior to buy and hold for up to 60 basis points per round trip. In 
addition, since one is exposed to the market for only ~8% of
asure, monies are freed up for other uses the rest of the time. 
Similar results are obtained for the US Dollar/Japanese Yen foreign exchange rate 
characterized 0.53 . However,  if we apply these same methods to a real-world 
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ser
 the eight possible three-day 
sequences of directions of price changes. In Figure 6 we duplicate his analysis of the 
NYA for the IXIC. (The figures  are remarkably similar.)  
ies with 0.5P , for example, the Philadelphia Exchange Gold and Silver Index 
(XAU), we find that they all fail. 
It is worth comparing the cycle decomposition and its associated predictor to a simpler 
statistical analysis of dependencies and a comparable predictor we develop from these 
dependencies. In [10], Zhang studies the history of directional price changes in the NYSE 
Composite Index (NYA) of 400 stocks from 1966 to 1996. He displays the frequency that 
an up (+) daily price change occurs following each of
0.48
0.59
0.44
0.65
0.48
0.65
0.50
0.61
Probability of following +
Relative weight
0.5
1.0
0.0
– – –– – +– + –– + ++ – –+ – ++ + –+ + +
 
Figure 6: Frequency with which a positive daily change in price occurs following each of 
 rationale 
for the Martingale predictor:   Regardless of the preceding two states, if the last state is 
“+” the next one is more likely to be as well; similarly with “−”.  
the eight possible three-day sequences of the direction of price-change for the IXIC. 
White circles indicate the relative weighting of the sequence. “+” = up; “−” = down. The 
small number of days of no change are excluded. (Daily data from  February, 1971 
through January, 2008) 
In  Figure 7 we transform the results of Figure 6 into expectations relative to a 
random sequence with the same overall upward bias as the NYA itself, to make it 
comparable to the cycle decomposition of Figure 5. Figure 7 makes evident the
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Figure 7: Relative probabilities of a positive daily price change following each of the 8 
possible daily sequences of direction of price changes over three preceding days. 
To improve the comparison—and highlight differences—the cycles of Figure 5 may 
be recast according as follows. The cycle { }4,4 is equivalent to , 
i.e., “ ” followed by “+” with frequency (probability) of 0.50 + 0.03 = 0.53. The 0.03 
comes from the second bar of 
11 11 111→ = ≡ + + +
+ +
Figure 5.  The cycle { }1,1  is equivalent to 
, i.e., “ ” followed by “00 000→ = ≡ − − −00 − − − ” with frequency (probability) of 0.50 
+ 0.08 = 0.58 (again from Figure 5) which is the same as followed by “+” with frequency 
(probability) of 1 − (0.50 + 0.08) = 0.42. All the cycles of  Figure 5 may be recast 
according to Table 1. Note that not every possible sequence of states for any length other 
than 2 is included and that the selection of states based on the cycle decomposition 
includes states of four different lengths.  
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Table 1: Probability of + following state sequences equivalent to cycles 
Cycle Prior States Calculation P(+) 
{ }1,1  −  − 1 − (0.50 + 0.08) = 0.42 
{ }4,4  + + 0.50 + 0.03 = 0.53 
{ }2,3,2  − + − 0.50 − 0.06 = 0.44 
{ }1,2,3,1  − − + − 1 − (0.50 − 0.04) = 0.46 
{ }2,4,3,2  − + + − 0.50 − 0.03 = 0.47 
{ }1,2,4,3,1  − − + + − 0.50 + 0.51 = 0.51 
The results of Table 1 are displayed in Figure 8. 
0.42
0.53
0.44 0.46 0.47
0.51
0
0.5
1
   – –      
{1,1}
   ++      
{4,4}
   – + – 
{2,3,2}
– – + –  
{1,2,3,1}
– ++ –  
{2,4,3,2}
– – ++–
{1,2,4,3,1}
Frequency Weight
 
Figure 8: Cycle decomposition of the IXIC recast in terms of frequencies that a given 
sequence of daily directions of price changes is followed by a positive change in price. 
The departures from 0.50 in Figure 8 show mean dependencies over the entire history 
of the IXIC that are noticeably smaller than the departures and dependencies in  Figure 6. 
At first glance therefore one might expect that a predictor based on the cycle 
decomposition would be less powerful than a comparable one based simply on the eight 
possible three-day histories. (The six sequences in the transformed cycle decomposition 
have a mean length of 3.3.) But the cycle decomposition arguably reveals more complex 
dependencies than the simpler statistical analysis. 
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In fact, using the eight three-day histories we construct a “dependency predictor” as 
close as possible in structure to the cycle-decomposition predictor and obtain the 
following results: Not taking into account transaction costs, the dependency predictor 
yields annualized returns of 26%  — better than buy and hold (consistent with the 
arguments against the efficient market hypothesis made in [10]), but not so good as either 
the Martingale or cycle-decomposition predictor. (The superior performance of the 
Martingale predictor vis-à-vis the dependency predictor suggests that an approach based 
strictly on these dependencies may attain maximum performance at least for this 
application by utilizing histories of no longer than a single day.) Furthermore, while the 
cycle decomposition predictor retains performance superior to buy and hold (and to 
Martingale) for up to 50 basis points of transaction costs, dependency predictor gains—as 
well as effectively the entire initial investment—are wholly wiped out by such costs with 
an annualized loss of −19% per year.  The dependency predictor retains performance 
superior to buy and hold only for transaction costs of no more than 17 basis points.  
It is valuable to examine the performance of the predictor during a set of different 
arbitrarily selected time-periods. Following the procedure in [10] as applied to the NYA, 
we divide the IXIC price-change series in equal fourths and apply the cycle predictor to 
each. Results are shown in Table 2 and in Figure 9. 
Table 2: Summary of cycle predictor results for IXIC divided into equal fourths (“BH” = “Buy and Hold”) 
Fourth Dates P <P> Ann.Ret.Cyc. Ann.Ret.BH Ann.Ret.Cyc−BH d 
1st 2/5/71-5/2/80 0.56 0.55 57% 2% 55% 0.16 
2nd 5/5/80-7/25/89 0.52 0.54 40% 9% 31% 0.13 
3rd 7/26/89-10/14/98 0.52 0.52 49% 23% 26% 0.11 
4th 10/15/98-1/23/08 0.49 0.49 -7% -6% -1% 0.09 
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Figure 9: Annualized return of cycle predictor, by fourth of IXIC, in excess of buy and hold return 
showing correlation with d and <P>. d is the pseudo-Euclidian distance between the cycle decomposition of 
the series and the expected decomposition of a random series with the same overall linear bias. <P> is the 
mean persistence of the series, i.e., averaged over 1 ' 1m 0< < . 
For each fourth we determine the annualized raw return (exclusive of transaction 
costs) from the cycle predictor and the annualized buy and hold return. We compute the 
difference and denote the associated P, < P > (averaged over 1 ' 1m 0< < ) and d. We see 
that the raw return from the cycle predictor in excess of the buy and hold return declines 
monotonically over time with monotonic declines in P, < P > and d. These results are 
consistent with the improved performance of the cycle predictor found previously with a 
persistence filter. 
However, it is also striking that the capacity of the unmodified toy predictor to achieve 
gains in excess of buy and hold declines monotonically over the life of the IXIC. This 
suggests that as the NASDAQ market has matured, it has become more efficient. 
Improved results (in excess of buy and hold) are still found using the persistence filter 
suggesting not only that the increase in efficiency has not eliminated exploitable marginal 
inefficiencies but that the nature of these inefficiencies are related to the remaining 
degree (or periods) of persistence. This latter hypothesis is consistent with the overall 
monotonic decline in both d and <P>. 
We now turn to a detailed explanation of the above findings.  
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3. MARKOV REPRESENTATION OF TH GAMES 
3.1 DEFINITIONS AND PAYOFFS FOR THE MH-MG, -MAJG, AND -$G 
In the simplest version of the MG, MAJG and $G, each of N agents has S = 2 
strategies, each of which encodes agents’ action in response to a history of length m = 2. 
In the TH variants, the point (or score) table associated with strategies’ success or failure 
is not maintained from the beginning of the game and is not ever growing. It is a rolling 
window of finite length τ (in the simplest case 1τ = ) ending at . At every 
discrete time-step  t, each agent selects its action according to the following 
“optimization” rule: It acts in accord with that strategy which shows the greatest 
accumulation of “points”—the number of times the strategy would have won had it 
hypothetically chosen the same action as that selected by (1) the minority of all agents at 
that same time t in the MG and THMG; or (2) the majority of all agents at that same time 
t in the MAJG and THMAJG; or (3) the majority of all agents at time in the $G and 
TH$G.   
1t m− −
1t −
The differences among the three games whether in their standard or TH variant may 
be most easily summarized by the respective expressions for the gain/loss to agents or to 
strategies at each time step t, given the vote imbalance ( )A t : 
(1) For the MG/THMG: ( ) ( ) ( )mini ig t a t A t= −  or ( ) ( )mini ig t Sgn a t A t= − ( )⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
(2) For the MAJG/THMAJG: ( ) ( ) ( )maji ig t a t A t= +  or ( ) ( )maji ig t Sgn a t A t= − ( )⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
(3) For the $G/TH$G: ( ) ( ) ( )1$i ig t a t A t= + −  or ( ) ( )$i ig t Sgn a t A t= + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦( )1  
The subscript i, which indicates the agent number, may be replaced by “i,s” to indicate 
agent i’s sth strategy with { }1,2,...s ∈ S . We see from these expressions that in the MG, 
agents strive to avoid the majority (i.e., to garner a share of a scarce resource); in the 
MAJG they strive to join the majority (i.e., to follow a trend); and the $G they strive to 
have joined the majority in advance of the others (i.e., to anticipate turning points). 
Because the standard MG is a frustrated system with multiple possible equilibria, it 
reaches an equilibrium state only after a very large but finite number of steps minstt . Both 
 19
the MAJG and $G attain their equilibrium states majstt and 
$
stt  rapidly. At stt  the dynamics 
and the behavior of individual agents for a given initial quenched disorder state are 
indistinguishable from an otherwise identical game with sttτ ≥ . 
The fundamental result of the MG is generally cast in terms of system volatility: 2 Nσ , 
that is, the fluctuations in the sign (or actual count) of the winning, minority state (i.e., 
the history).  All variations of agent and strategy reward functions depend on the negative 
sign of the majority vote. Therefore both agent and strategy “wealth” (points, whether 
“real” or hypothetical) are inverse or negative (implicit) functions of the volatility: The 
lower the value of  2 Nσ  the greater the mean “wealth” of the “system”, i.e., of agents. To 
emphasize the relation of all three games to market-games and to optimization, we 
transform the fundamental results from statements on the properties of  2 Nσ   to change in 
wealth, i.e., W tΔ Δ   for agents and  W tΔ Δ   for strategies. These transformations of agent and 
strategy performance are intrinsically more natural for the MAJG and $G. 
We use the simplest possible computations— ( ) ( ) ( )mini it Sgn a t A t= − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦g , 
 and ( ) ( ) ( )maji ig t Sgn a t A t= + ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ( ) ( ) ( )1 t$ig t Sgn= + −i Aa t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ —to track agent and 
strategy per-step gain.  
3.2 DERIVATION OF THE FULL TRANSITION MATRIX 
As discussed in [2] and previously in [1], the THMG—in contrast to the MG proper—
may be expressed in Markov chain formalism. This formalism simplifies the analytic 
expression of the MG for a finite number of agents and lends itself for this reason more 
readily to real-world markets: Also because a finite-length history of past information 
corresponds more closely to the way that real-world trading strategies are devised (very 
old information is considered less pertinent than more recent information). Furthermore, 
there is no reason to believe that real-world markets are at or close to equilibrium. The 
Markov formulation and its decomposition into deterministic cycles is thereby naturally 
extended to real-world financial time-series.   
The Markov formulation of the THMG requires (re-)partitioning the set agents into 
two groups at each time-step: A sub-set of agents whose decisions are wholly determined 
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and the complementary sub-set of agents whose actions must be decided by chance. The 
relative dominance of the determined subset highlights the role of an underlying 
deterministic dynamic in the THMG to which the relatively rarer instances of random 
strategy selection may be viewed as a perturbation. Characterizing these two subsets 
analytically is therefore the means for developing a Markov formulation. This in turns 
allows decomposition of the Markov chain into a finite set of wholly deterministic cycles. 
The role of chance may then be characterized as jumps between cycles, each associated 
with a certain probability. The characteristic object of a Markov formulation is a 
transition matrix whose elements represent the probabilities of the system changing 
from one state to another. We here summarize only the elements of the Markov 
formalism for the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G. Derivation and details may be found in 
[3]. 
Tˆ
At every discrete time-step t, each agent of N (index i) independently re-selects one of 
its S strategies. It “votes” as the selected strategy dictates by taking one of two “actions,” 
designated by a binary value: 
 ( ) { }1,0 ,   ,ia t i t∈ ∀  (2) 
The state of the system as a whole at time t is a mapping of the sum of all the agents’ 
actions to the integer set { }12N N− , where  is the number of 1 votes and 
. This mapping is defined as : 
1N
0N N N= − 1
0 ( ) ( ) 1
1
2
N
i
i
A t a t N N N
=
= − = −∑  (3) 
If ( ) 2NA t > , then the minority of agents will have chosen 0 at time t ( ); if 0N N< 1
( ) 2NA t < , then the minority of agents will have chosen 1 at time t ( N ). In the MG 
and THMG the minority choice is the “winning” decision for t . In the MAJG, THMAJG, 
$G and TH$G the majority choice is winning. This choice is then mapped back to {
1 < 0N
}0,1 : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) { } { }Sgn   1, 1 0,1sys sysD t A t D t= − ∴ ∈ − + →⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4) 
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For the MG, MAJG and $G, binary strings of length m form histories , i.e., 
. For the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G binary strings of length 
( )tμ
( )dimm tμ= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ m τ+  
form paths (or “path histories”) [1,11], i.e., ( )dim tm τ μ+ = ( )tμ
t
, where we define  as a 
history in the standard game and μ as a path in the TH game. Then as demonstrated in 
[1-3], any THMG has a Markov chain formulation. In our later discussion of the cycle 
decomposition method we will use the typical initial quenched disorder tensor Ω  shown 
in 
ˆ
(5), and its symmetrized equivalent ( )12ˆ ˆ ˆ= +ΩTΨ Ω  with { } { }, , 2,2,31m S N =
Ωˆ
ijΩ … Ωˆ
Ωˆ
2,5
, 
Positions along all S edges of  represent an ordered listing of all available strategies.  
The numerical values in  indicate the number of times a specific strategy-tuple 
has been selected in the initial endowment of the S strategies to the N agents. Without 
loss of generality, we may express  in upper-triangular form since the order of 
strategies in a agent has no meaning. E.g., Ω =3 means that there are 3 agents 
comprised of strategy 2 and strategy 5.) 
1
0 0
2 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 3 3 1 1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
  (5) 
0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1ˆ
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Ω ⎟
Actions are drawn from a reduced strategy space (RSS) [12]. Each action is associated 
with a strategy k and a path tμ . Together they can be represented in table form as a 
( ) (dim RSS dim t )μ×
{
 binary matrix with elements converted for convenience from 
} { }0,1 1, 1→ − + , i.e., { }1,+1tkaμ ∈ − and defined as: 
 22
 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
aˆ
− − − −
− − + +
− + − +
− + + −
+ − − +
+ − + −
+ + − −
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜≡ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (6) 
 
The change in wealth (point gain or loss) associated with each of the 8 strategies for 
the 8 paths (= allowed transitions between the 4 histories) at any time t is then: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }min , 1 ˆ 2 1 ,2t t tS a Mod tμ μ μδ − = + × − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦K T 1μ  (7) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, 1 ˆ 2 1 ,2majt t tS a Mod tμ μ μδ − = − × − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦TK 1μ  (8) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }$ , 1 1ˆ 2 1 ,2t t tS a Mod tμ μ μδ − −= − × − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦T 1μ
[
K
 (9) 
 
] ( )tμ and ( )1tμM( ,od x y is “x modulo y”). −  label each of the 4 histories 
{ }00,01,10,11  hence take on one of values { }1,2,3,4 . Equation (7) picks out from (6) the 
correct change in wealth over a single step since the strategies are ordered in symmetrical 
sequence. 
The change in points associated with each strategy for each of the allowed transitions 
between paths tμ of the last τ  time steps used to score the strategies is: 
 ( ) ( )
1
,
0
t
game game
t i t i
i
s S
τ
μ μ μδ
−
1− − −
=
= ∑ KK  (10) 
For example, for m = 2 and t = 1 the strategy scores are kept for only a single time-step. 
There is no summation so (10) in matrix form reduces to: 
 ( ) ( ), 1t
game game
t ts Sμ μ μδ −=
KK
 (11) 
or, listing the results for all 8 path histories:  
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 ˆˆgame gameμ δ=s S  (12) 
ˆ gameδS  is an 8μ8 matrix that can be read as a lookup table. It denotes the change in points 
accumulated over t = 1 time steps for each of the 8 strategies over each of the 8 path-
histories 
Instead of computing ( )gameA t , we compute ( )game tA μ . Then for each of the 2 8m τ+ =  
possible tμ , ( )game tA μ  is composed of a subset of wholly determined agent votes and a 
subset of undetermined agents whose votes must be determined by a coin toss: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )game game gamet D t UA A A tμ μ= + μ  (13) 
Some agents are undetermined at time t because their strategies have the same score and 
the tie has to be broken with an unbiased coin toss. The ( )gameUA tμ  are therefore random 
variables characterized by the binomial distribution. Their actual values vary with the 
number of undetermined agents, which may be expressed as [1-3]: 
 
( )
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mt
min
U t
min min
N
a a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ
μ
− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T  (14) 
 
( )
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mt
maj
U t
maj maj
N
a a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ
μ
− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T  (15) 
 
( )
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mt
$
U t
$ $
N
a a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ
μ
− −
−
− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T  (16) 
“ δ⊗ ” is a generalized outer product, with the product being the Kronecker delta. gameUN
K
 
constitutes a vector of such values. The summed value of all undetermined decisions for a 
given tμ is distributed binomially. Similarly [1-3]: 
 
( )
( ){ } ( )t
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
min
D t
min min
rr
A
Sgn s s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− •⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D  (17) 
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 ( )
( ) ( ){ ( )t
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
maj
D t
maj maj
rr
A
Sgn s s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤
}
− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− • −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D  (18) 
 
( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )t-1
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
$
D t
$ $
rr
A
Sgn s s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎛ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− • −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D ⎞  (19) 
We define gameDA
K
 as a vector of the determined contributions to ( )A t tfor each path μ in 
each respective game. In Eqs. (17)-(19), tμ numbers paths from 1 to 8 and is therefore 
here an index. g
t
amesμ
K
tis the “ μ th” vector of net point gains or losses for each strategy 
when at t the system has traversed the path tμ ( i.e., it is the  “ tμ th” element of the matrix 
ˆˆgame gameμ δ=s S
t
in (12)). “ ” is a generalized outer product of two vectors with subtraction 
as the product. The two vectors in this instance are the same, i.e., gamesμ
K . “ ” is Hadamard 
(element-by-element) multiplication and “ ” the standard inner product. The index r 
refers to strategies in the RSS. Summation over r transforms the base-ten code for 
D
i
tμ   
into { }1, 2,3, 4,1, 2,3, 4 . Selection of the proper number is indicated by the subscript 
expression on the entire right-hand side of (14). This expression yields an index number, 
i.e., selection takes place 1 + Modulo 4 with respect to the value of ( )1tμ −  in the THMG 
and THMAJG, and with respect to the value of ( )1 1tμ − −  in the TH$G. 
2m mτ τ+ +To obtain the transition matrix for the system as a whole, we require the 2 ×
1
 
adjacency matrix that filters out disallowed transitions. Its elements are ,t tμ μΓ − : 
  (20) 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Γ
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Equations (14)-(20) yield the history-dependent ( ) ( )m mτ τ× +  matrix ˆ g+ ameT with 
elements 
1,t t
gameT μ − , representing the 16 allowed probabilities of transitions between the 2 
t
μ
sets of  8 path-histories and 1tμ μ − : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) { }( )( )
1
1
minmin min
min
,
,
min min
1
0 2
D t t
xx
−
=
⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎣⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭^
 
1 Sgn 2 2Mod ,2 1
t t
t t
U tU t U t
NN N
U t
T
A x N
μ μ
μ μ
μμ μ
Γ
δ μ μ μ
−
−
=
×
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤× + − + − ⎦∑
(21) 
1,t t
majTμ μ − =
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) { }( )( )
1,
1
0
1 Sgn 2 2Mod ,2 1
2
t t
majmaj maj
tUtU tU
NN N
maj maj
D t U t t
xx
A x N
μ μ
μμ μ
Γ
δ μ μ μ
−
−
=
×
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤× + − + −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ^
(22) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) { }( )( )
1
1
$$ $
$
,
,
$ $
1
0
1 Sgn 2 2Mod ,2 1
2
t t
t t
U tU t U t
NN N
D t U t t
xx
T
A x N
μ μ
μ μ
μμ μ
Γ
δ μ μ μ
−
−
−
=
=
×
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤× + − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ ^ −
 (23) 
 
The expression 
, ,1
2
game game
U t U t
N N
x
μ μ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠^ in  (21)-(23) represents the binomial distribution of 
undetermined outcomes under a fair coin-toss required to break ties, with mean = 
( )gameD tA . 
or the quenched disorder matrix in (5), we obtain the 
: 
μ
As an exam
llowing 
ple we will use later, f
ˆ minTfo
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0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0⎛ ⎞
 
⎟
 (24) 
3.3 EXTRACTION OF THE DOMINANT (DETERMINISTIC) CYCLE OR 
CYCLES 
S
we could generate it un-ambivalently, should correspond to the most likely, wholly 
determ
 
⎟
 (25) 
(25) corresponds to the following definite transitions (read “column no. → row no.”):  
 
5 1
1 2
6 4
8 7
4 8
→
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ
0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0.1445 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0.8555 0 0 0 0
min
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
T
uppose we were to round all entries in (24) to either 1 or 0. Such a matrix, assuming 
inistic path traversed by the system.  In the case (24) we cannot round off un-
ambivalently as there are two pairs of entries equal exactly to 0.5. (This implies four 
possible deterministic configurations since choosing 1 or 0 for one entry in each pair 
automatically determines the value of the entry as pairs must add to 1):  
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ
0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0
0 0 1 ? 0 0 0 1 ? 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
min
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
T
⎧ ⎫⎪
2 4
⎪→⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪→⎨ ⎬→⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪→⎪ ⎪→⎩ ⎭
 (26) 
plus one of the following sets of additional transitions: 
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3 5 3 5 3 6 3 6
, , ,
7 5 7 6 7 5 7 6
→ → → →⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟→ → → →⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (27) 
Note that th
e first state in the 
sequence). The two possible states which absorb it are 5 or 6, which deterministically go 
 the rounding procedure 
leaves us with are the transitions 7→5 or  7→6. These fill out (26) as follows: 
ere are no transitions to 3. 3 is an
“absorbed” by other states should it appear (only once possibly, as th
 “emitting” state that will always be 
to 1 or 4 respectively. Thus, the only meaningful alternatives that
 
2 4 7 6
4 8 6 4
8 7 4 8
7 5 8 7
5 1
or
→ →⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟
1 2→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→ →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟→ →⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→ →⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 (28) 
corresponding to the cycles { }1,2,4,8,7,5,1 or { }4,8,7,6,4 . From the second set of 
transitions in (28) we have excluded 1 quence 1→2→4 is absorbed 
by 
→2 and 2→4 as the se
{ }4,8,7,6,4  in the same →
We anticipate from this intuitive analysis that there are two equiprobable determ
cycles that can serve equally as the 0th order approximation. 
More formally, however, we can exclude from eqn. (21) the undetermined component, 
 way that 3→5 or 3 6 are. 
inistic 
i.e., ( )minU tN μ  so that 
 
1
min
0, ,
min
t t
T μ μ − =
⎡ ⎤( )( ) { }( )Sgn 2 2Mod ,2 1A xΓ δ μ μ× + +⎣ ⎦1, 1t t D t tμ μ − −
This equation yields the following transition matrix: 
 
−  (29) 
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 ⎟
 (30) 
It includes all deterministic transitions as in the rounding procedure but excludes the 
on
4. CYCLE DECOMPOSITION OF TH-GAMES 
a deterministic system with 
pe
0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
min
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
T
es that are ambivalent (equiprobable). For quenched disorders that yield no entries of 
0.5, the result is a single deterministic cycle. We will see that when the cycle 
decomposition is performed analytically on this Ωˆ 1, the two equiprobable most heavily-
weighted cycles reappear with the appropriate weight (and other less probable cycles 
appear with their appropriate weights). For most Ωˆ , especially those for larger N, 
equiprobable dominant cycles are unlikely. 
 
In [4], the MG proper (not the THMG) is represented as 
rturbations due to tie-breaks. The underlying deterministic system is likewise 
characterized as an Eulerian path on a de Bruijn graph even though the system’s path is 
not Markovian. As described above, a close approximation of the underlying determinism 
in the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G may be achieved simply by rounding every element 
of ˆ gameT (eqns (21)-(23)) to either 0 or 1. When N is relatively large, Tˆ is relatively 
unlikely to have elements equal to 12  and the rounded Tˆ ( 0ˆ≡ T ) well-characterizes the 
system, even for small m and τ. But for many interesting values of N (i.e., 31N = ), 
elements equal to 12 are common in ˆ gameT and there are different (binomially-dis d) 
ˆ
tribute
0
gameT . 
                                                 
1 So as not to obscure this potential complication, was chosen in part because it illustrates it. Ωˆ
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Note that elements rounded to 0 are eliminated from ˆ gameT . If no values other than 0,1 
are allowed, 0ˆ
gameT will therefore either represent one cycle from the De Bruijn graph, or 
if more than one, the cycles will be disjoint. If elements exactly equal to 12 are left 
unchanged, then for every such element there will be a cycle. The cycles will not 
necessarily be disjoint and the dynamic represented by 0ˆ
gameT  may then be viewed as two 
(or more) deterministic orbits in state-space with a 0.5 probability of switching from one 
to another upon exiting any the state with element 12 . Similarly, ˆ gameT unmodified (with 
arbitrary elements [ ], 0,1gamei jT ∈ ) can be thought of as a (probabilistically) weighted 
superposition of all possible deterministic cycles present in ˆ gameT . In general, the cycle 
with the greatest weight provides a good first-order approximation to ˆ gameT .  
The upper limit on the number of terms (cycles) required to decompose a finite-sized 
transition matrix is also finite but grows super-exponentially with m τ+ . The accuracy of 
the approximation grows with the number of cycles included. But more important for our 
purposes is the fact that deterministic cycles are much easier to study individually than 
their composite, and characteristics emerge in the aggregate that shed light on features of 
the latter.  
4.1 EXTRACTION OF CYCLES FROM A BINARY SERIES 
We require first a method of extracting cycles from a given binary data series. 
Consider an arbitrary finite binary history (not necessarily derived from a TH ˆ gameT , but a 
purely arbitrary history selected at random):  
  (31) {1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0 }…
This is equivalent to the following path-history (binary converted to digital) when 
paths are defined as having length ' 3m = (i.e., were eqn.  (31) in fact a THMG history, 
then “ m τ+ ” would likewise = 3): 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
{ 1,0,0 , 0,0,1 , 0,1,0 , 1,0,0 , 0,0,0 , 0,0,1 , 0,1,1 , 1,1,1 ,
1,1,0 , 1,0,1 , 0,1,1 , 1,1,1 , 1,1,0 , 1,0,1 , 0,1,0 , 1,0,0 ,
0,0,1 , 0,1,1 , 1,1,0 , 1,0,0 , 0,0,0 , 0,0,1 , 0,1,1 , 1,1,0 ,
1,0,1 , 0,1,1 , 1,1,0 , 1,0,0 }
{5,2,3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,
→…
3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5 }…
 (32) 
( )'9 2 1mA cycle consists of any sequence of digital states of length ≤ = +  that begins 
and ends with the same digit, and within which no digit is otherwise found more than 
once. The first cycle in this series is { }5,2,3,5 . Extract and tabulate this cycle and replace 
it with 5, the repeated initial digit. The next cycle is { }4,8,7,6,4
'2m
. Extract this cycle and 
replace it with 4.  This leaves 5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2. Continue extracting and tabulating until 
no cycles are left. Ignore any remaining digits. Then repeat the process seven more times 
(i.e. for a total of  times), each time dropping one more digit from the beginning of the 
series. For the beginning of the series in (32) Table 3 shows the first four of the eight 
required extractions. 
Table 3: Extraction of Cycles from a Series 
Remaining Sequence Extracted Cycles 
(5,2,3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)   
(5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5) 
(5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)         
(5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)       
(5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)      
(5,1,2,4,7,5)   
(5) 
– (5,2,3,5) 
– (4,8,7,6,4) 
– (5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5) 
– (5,2,4,7,5) 
– (4,7,6,4) 
– (5,1,2,4,7,5) 
  
(2,3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)     
(2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)     
(2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)    
(2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)         
(2,4,7,6,4,7,5) 
(2,4,7,5) 
– (2,3,5,1,2) 
– (4,8,7,6,4) 
– (2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2) 
– (2,4,7,5,1,2) 
– (4,7,6,4) 
  
(3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)       
(3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)       
(3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)     
(3,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)    
(3,5,1,2,4,7,5) 
(3,5) 
– (4,8,7,6,4) 
– (3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3) 
– (5,2,4,7,5) 
– (4,7,6,4) 
– (5,1,2,4,7,5) 
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(5,1,2,4,8,7,6,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5) 
(5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)         
(5,1,2,4,7,5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)     
(5,1,2,4,7,6,4,7,5)      
(5,1,2,4,7,5)   
(5) 
– (4,8,7,6,4) 
– (2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2) 
– (1,2,4,7,5,1) 
– (4,7,6,4) 
– (5,1,2,4,7,5) 
Categorize and count the number of times each cycle appears and compute its proportion 
as a fraction all cycle types. Adjust this proportion by treating cyclic permutations of a 
cycle as the same type and combine them into one category. Results for the partial series  
(four of eight extractions) in (32) are shown in Table 4. The proportional representation 
of a cycle in the complete extraction constitutes its “weight”. 
Table 4: Computation of Cycle Weights 
Cycle Raw Count Adj. Count Weight (Proportion) 
(4,7,6,4) 4 4 0.190 
(5,2,3,5) 1 1 0.048 
(2,3,5,1,2) 1 1 0.048 
(4,8,7,6,4) 4 4 0.190 
(5,2,4,7,5) 2 2 0.095 
(1,2,4,7,5,1) 1 5 0.238 
(2,4,7,5,1,2) 1 – – 
(5,1,2,4,7,5) 3 – – 
(2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2) 2 2 0.095 
(3,5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3) 1 2 0.095 
(5,1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5) 1 – – 
The cycles in column 1 of Table 4 can be represented as adjacency matrices within the 
space of all possible cycles on the binary deBruijn graph of order 3 as shown in Figure 
10. Call this column vector .  J
K
:
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0
1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
yzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
ijjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
yzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
ijjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
yzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
ijjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
>
K{ k { k { k
Figure 10: J = the 8 non-zero-weight cycles of 
 
(32) in adjacency matrix form. 
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Call column 4 of  Table 4 ωK , the weights of every cycle. The dot product ω⋅JK K  yields 
(33), the transition matrix for the series in (32):  
  (33) 
0 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0
0.38 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0
0 0.10 0 0 0 0.19 0 0
0 0.52 0 0 0 0.38 0 0
0 0 0.29 0 0 0 0.33 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.57 0
0 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 0.38
0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 0
ω
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
J
K K
In this case the resulting matrix has complementary entries that do not add to 1 
because the series is so short. But as proven formally in [13,14], in the limit of a 
sufficiently long such series, the transition values obtained by a complete extraction are 
accurate and arbitrarily precise, i.e., for every pair of non-zero entries 
{ }, 1,,i j i jk kJ J + representing an allowed transition in the R R×  transition matrix (where kJ
{ }1 2, ,J J J… …,k RJ ≡ JK ), ( , 1,lim 1i j i jk kL J J +→∞ )+ = , with L the series’ length. In any series of 
such finite length, the complementary entries { }, ,i jJ J 1,i jk k +  may be normalized so their 
sum equals 1 to convert actual transition frequencies to approximate transition 
probabilities: 
0 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.61 0 0 0
0.38 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.39 0 0 0
0 0.10 0 0 0 0.19 0 0 0 0.16 0 0 0 0.33 0 0
0 0.52 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 0.84 0 0 0 0.67 0 0
0 0 0.29 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.37 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6
0 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 0.38
0 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 0
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3 0
0 0 0 0.58 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 0
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎟  (34) 
 
Note, too, that the weightiest cycle treated as having weight = 1 provides a 0th order 
(and therefore wholly deterministic) approximation for the series. (The closer its actual 
weight is to 1 the more accurate the approximation) . In the above instance: 
 33
  (35) 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎟
ˆ min
ˆ
ˆ majT ˆ $
 
We may create higher order (no longer wholly deterministic) approximations by 
adding the second weightiest matrix, third weightiest, etc. (and again normalizing the 
entries to 1). 
We now demonstrate the use of this decomposition in the series generated by the 
THMG by analytically decomposing the transition matrix T derived from an initial 
quenched disorder tensor Ω , in particular the tensor of (5). Identical methods will 
decompose and T . We will later use the above empirical method to approximate 
series generated by the (non-TH) MG, MAJG and $G as well as real-world series. Note 
that the decomposition of a given finite series produces an approximation of a transition 
matrix whereas an actual transition matrix generates a series of unlimited length. 
4.2  ANALYTIC FORM OF A CYCLE DECOMPOSITION 
The decomposition of a known transition matrix into its weighted cycle structure was 
first proposed in Ref. [13]. For any stochastic matrix (of which the transition matrix for 
THMG is an instance of size 
Tˆ
2 2m mτ τ+ +× ), and the set C of all possible directed cycles  
of the adjacency matrix of , it can be shown that [15]: 
cJ
Γˆ Tˆ
 ( ),, ,   1 dim ,   1 , 2
c
c i j
mc
i j c
c i
c
J
T c C i
J
j τ
ω
ω
+= ≤ ≤ ≤
∑
∑ ≤  (36) 
(recall that the cω are the cycle weights) where  
 
2 2
,
1 1
m m
c c
i i j
j i
J J J
τ τ+ +
= =
= = ,ci j∑ ∑ . (37) 
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,
c
i jJ =1 if (i,j) is a directed edge of , 0 otherwise. In addition, 
cJ
 ci c
c
Jπ ω= i∑  (38) 
so that 
 , ,
ˆ;   ci i j c i j
c c
T J J cπ ω π π= ⋅ = = ω⋅∑ ∑T KK K  (39) 
m τwhere the iπ are the 2 + Tˆ
c
steady-state probabilities derivable from . (39) represents 
dim(C) simultaneous matrix equations to be solved for the ω . 
For the of equation Tˆmin (5) ( Γˆ of equation (20)) which has 4 cycles only, and which 
has S agents only, 
 { }1 2 3 4, , ,J J J J≡ =JK  (40) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
, ,
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
,
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎫⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠⎭
( ) ( )
 
corresponding to ( ) ( ){ }4,7,6,4 , 4,8,7,6,4 , 1,2,4,7,5,1 , 1,2,4,8,7,5,1
ˆ
 and their cyclic 
permutations. (In general, a random binary series converted to paths of length 3 can and 
if long enough will have 19 unique cycles. The truncated series (32) we used as a sample 
contains only the 8 cycles shown in adjacency matrix form in Figure 10, of which we 
showed the extraction of 4 in detail. In the present example derived from a THMG tensor, 
there are only 4 extractable cycles in toto reflecting the high degree of determinism in the 
time series generated by Ω . From (37): 
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  (41) 
1 4
1 1
1 4
8 8
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1ˆ
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
J J
J J
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟≡ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
J
"
# % #
"
⎟
ˆ ⋅JSolving (39) (equivalently,π ω= KK  ), for the cω using the method of cofactor 
expansion, we obtain the approximate values shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Cycle Weights 
 Cycle Weight
w1 (4,7,6,4) 0.072 
w2 (4,8,7,6,4) 0.428 
w3 (1,2,4,7,5,1) 0.072 
w4 (1,2,4,8,7,5,1) 0.428 
ˆ
cycω⋅ ≡J TK K : To check on the correctness of the solution for equation (20), 
  (42) 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ ˆ;     
0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0.1445 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.1445 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0.8555 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8555 0 0 0 0
cyc
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
T T
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
0 1 0
0 0 0
Note the one pair of entries that differ between the two matrices in (42). The matrix 
equation (39) may be solved by a number of methods (e.g., division-free row reduction, 
one-step row reduction; we used cofactor expansion). All typically also have difficulty 
with probabilities = 0.5. We see that this has happened here. Formally, the convergence 
of to is in general weak and “almost sure” [16]. We will see by comparison to 
numerical simulation that the small error thus introduced has no effect on our use of the 
decomposition. The difference between the two matrices in 
ˆ
cycT Tˆ
(42) provides an illustration 
of one reason why this has no effect: The original matrix on the left of Tˆ (42) shows an 
equiprobable transition from path 3 [from ( )0,1,0 ] to path 5 or to path 6 [to or ( )1,0,0
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to ( ]. But looking at row 3 of either matrix, we see that state 3 is inaccessible 
altogether (no transitions from any other state to it), hence no transition from state 3 is 
possible. This is reflected in (on the right) by the two 0 zero entries in place of 0.5. 
Thus, the two matrices, being at equilibrium, are equivalent. 
)
ˆ
cycT
ˆ
ˆ
cycT
ˆ ˆ
cycT
1,0,1
ˆ
cycT
4.3 COMPARISON TO NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
Each cycle in the decomposition is a purely deterministic, discrete periodic process. 
As noted before, the elements of  represent the probabilities of transitions between 
cycles rather than (equivalently in T ) transitions between path histories. All the 
dynamics of the full  THMG can therefore be derived from the deterministic dynamics of 
the THMG around just one of every cycle, properly composed and weighted. For 
example, if were composed of just two cycles of respective lengths 5 and 4, the total 
change in agent and strategy wealth over these will be computed over twenty (the lowest 
common multiple) steps—4 of the first cycle times 5 of the second, each times its 
appropriate weight, and then summed. The net per-step gain (or loss) in wealth for both 
agents and for their underlying strategies is easily computable around any cycle using (7)
-(12). For the T and of (20), with 31 agents, overall results are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Elements of the Cycle Decomposition of the THMG with S and C agents 
Cycle Weight DW 
(4,7,6,4)   
DWagent –0.10 
DWstrategy 0.08(4) –0.09 
(4,8,7,6,4)   
DWagent –0.23 
DWstrategy 0.85(4) –0.06 
(1,2,4,7,5,1)   
DWagent –0.11 
DWstrategy 0.06(3) –0.04 
(1,2,4,8,7,5,1)   
DWagent –0.19 
DWstrategy 0.00(0) –0.03 
Weighted Composite   
DWagent –0.21 
DWstrategy 1.00(0) –0.06 
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Comparison to numerical and the standard analytic results are in Table 7 showing the 
close agreement among methods. (“Analytic” results here refer to the mean per-step 
change in wealth averaged over all agents and all strategies respectively, i.e., 
 as detailed in  section 3.2 as well as in [2] and [1]. Numeric results refer 
to numeric simulations of the THMG. In both cases we refer here to a single initial 
quenched disorder matrix. As explained in [2], this example is typical with changes in 
wealth close to the average over many initial quenched disorders.) 
,agent strategyW WΔ Δ
Table 7: Comparison of cycle decomposition to analytic and numeric results 
 DWagent DWstrategy 
Numeric –0.20 –0.07 
Analytic –0.22 –0.06 
Cycle Decomp. –0.21 –0.06 
4.4 CYCLE ANALYSIS OF THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 
Ref. [2] discusses another feature of MG’s and THMG’s: Even though agents’ choice 
of strategy is designed to optimize their performance, the performance of agents (their 
mean per-step accumulation of wealth) is always on average poorer than the measured 
performance of their S  strategies. Agents choose which strategy to use based on a 
comparison of how their strategies perform: The optimization rule employed is simply 
“deploy whichever strategy would have accumulated the largest number of points over 
the time horizon τ ”. Yet by this measure agents appear to do better by selecting a single 
strategy and sticking to it, or by randomly selecting strategies (or actions) at each time-
step. Thus the control method in the MG and THMG yields what may be called an 
“illusion of control”. The relative outperformance of strategies as thus defined can be 
seen as arising from the anti-persistence characteristic of MG-generated time-series. As 
discussed in ref. [3], MAJG, THMAJG, $G and TH$G display no illusion of control and 
the time-series they generate are persistent at all m. 
Another way of understanding this phenomenon is by examining the performance of 
agents and strategies around deterministic cycles in the THMG. Depending on the 
weights, a single cycle may dominate the behavior of the THMG. In other instances just a 
few cycles dominate. It turns out that, for a majority of Ωˆ , most cycles show an illusion 
of control under the MG optimization rule for most strategy pairs. Therefore, the illusion 
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is expected on average over many different initial configurations of . As cycles are 
deterministic, we can examine the behavior of the optimization rule in particularly simple 
form. 
Ωˆ
Table 8 illustrates the behavior of the MG optimization rule around all possible 
(allowed) cycles as averaged over every possible strategy and every agent (i.e., every 
possible pair of strategies) for { } { }, , , 2,2,31,1m S N τ = . (This is the first occasion where 
[almost] all possible cycles based on paths of length 3 are listed. We take this opportunity 
to note that the two simplest cycles, ( )1,1 and ( )8,8 , and only these two, are absent. This 
is a typical feature of the THMG and demonstrates immediately the tendency of its binary 
time-series toward anti-persistence, at least at the smallest possible ' .)  m
Table 8: Optimization of All Standard Strategy Pairs over All Cycles and time steps 
Cycle ‚DWagent, all pairsÚ 
per cycle 
‚DWagent, all pairsÚ 
per time-step 
‚DWstrats, allÚ 
per cycle 
‚DWstrats, allÚ 
per time-step  
(3,6,3) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(2,3,5,2) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(4,7,6,4) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(1,2,3,5,1) –0.5 –0.125 0. 0. 
(2,4,7,5,2) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(4,8,7,6,4) –0.5 –0.125 0. 0. 
(1,2,4,7,5,1) –0.5 –0.1 0. 0. 
(2,4,8,7,5,2) –0.5 –0.1 0. 0. 
(1,2,4,8,7,5,1) –1.0 –0.1667 0. 0. 
(2,3,6,4,7,5,2) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(2,4,7,6,3,5,2) 0. 0. 0. 0. 
(1,2,3,6,4,7,5,1) –0 –0.0714 0. 0. 
(1,2,4,7,6,3,5,1) –0.5 –0.0714 0. 0. 
(2,3,6,4,8,7,5,2) –0.5 –0.0714 0. 0. 
(2,4,8,7,6,3,5,2) –0.5 –0.0741 0. 0. 
(1,2,3,6,4,8,7,5,1) –1.0 –0.125 0. 0. 
(1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,1) –1.0 –0.125 0. 0. 
Mean, all cycles  –0.07682 0. 0. 
As noted before, from (7)-(12) it is straightforward to calculate the number of points 
gained or lost around cycles. We see that the per-step performance of strategies averaged 
over all possible strategies is neutral around every cycle ( 0 W tW Δ ΔΔ = = ), while agent 
performance is ~ -0.08 averaged over all cycles. (The unit step change in wealth must be 
adjusted for the differing number of steps in different cycles. This has been done in 
columns 3 and 5 of Table 8 )  
Note, too, that the change in wealth for strategies when averaged over all possible cycles 
and all possible strategies is zero  For almost all given quenched disorder matrices the 
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distribution of strategies is asymmetrical, and the asymmetry of this distribution, in 
conjunction with the minority rule for winning, ensures an average loss (even if under 
most circumstances less of a loss than for agents [2]). In other words, a “crowd” of 
strategies in one region of strategy space insures that their decisions will on average be 
the majority, hence losing decisions. By averaging over all possible strategies, we 
eliminate the expected asymmetry in strategy distribution. 
Similar patterns are found for all but a few exceptional values of τ where mean agent 
performance is also neutral. (That this must be so follows from the fact that the mean 
performance of all agents in a given Ωˆ is at best 0.)  Thus, over many different , the 
optimization rule of the THMG degrades mean performance relative to the measured 
performance of underlying strategies. In Ref. [2], the inclusion of agents who select their 
worst-performing strategy is discussed. It turns out that these agents outperform not only 
standard agents, they outperform their underlying strategies and can even regularly attain 
net positive gain which for a standard agents in a MG structure is exceedingly rare. The 
performance of such agents around cycles have the same values as standard agents but 
with the opposite sign.  
Ωˆ
4.5 CYCLES, ANTIPERSISTENCE AND THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL 
As discussed in [2], the degree to which agents underperform their own strategies 
varies with the phase as parameterized by a [17]. Our simulations have been performed 
in the “crowded” phase—the number of agents is significantly larger than the number of 
strategies in the RSS. Several agents are therefore likely to share strategies. As noted in 
[11], the “crowd” of such agents at any given time-step acts like a single “super-agent”; 
the remaining agents as a (non-synchronized) “anticrowd” whose actions will conform to 
the minority choice. Thus, when a strategy is used, it is probably used by more than one 
agent, often by many agents. If by enough, it becomes a losing strategy with large 
probability—precisely because so many agents “think” it’s the best choice and use it. 
This implies that at the next time step, agents will not use it. The time-series of choices 
DA
K
therefore does not show trends (or persistence), but rather anti-persistence.  
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Anti-persistence is not equivalent to “random” and is scale-dependent. Consider a 
binary time-series with an m-bit ( )tμ  defined in the same way as we have in the MG or 
THMG: ( )tμ  is a window of  length m sliding with a time step of one unit: 
=( )tμ ( ) ({ )}1 , s t− + …
{
s t m  A perfectly anti-persistent binary series at scale m=2, for 
example, is characterized as follows: Select any one instance of the four possible 
( ) }00,01,10,11tμ ∈ . Identify the following bit ( ) { }1 0,1s t + ∈ . Now identify the next 
instance of the selected . If the series is perfectly anti-persistent, the following bit 
will be 1 if the previous following bit was 0, and 0 if the previous following bit was 1. 
(tμ )
Such a series can be generated by two lookup tables indicating what bit follows which 
. Whatever bit is indicated by the first table, the opposite bit is indicated by the 
second. Whenever a entry in a table is used for a given 
( )tμ
( )tμ , the other table is used when 
 occurs again [18]. These tables are identical to strategy pairs at the maximum 
Hamming distance in the MG. No matter which of the 16 possible strategies is used for 
table 1, and regardless of which of the 4 possible 
( )tμ
( )tμ  are used to initiate it, the time 
series generated by these tables will rapidly settle into perfect anti-persistence.  
Ignoring the initialization steps and steps to convergence,  it turns out that such a 
perfectly anti-persistent series will always follow one of the two cycles on the binary 
deBruijn graph of order 3 that touch every possible 3-bit state:  { }1,2, yc. 
or {
4,8,7,6,3,5,1 et. c
}1,2, cyc. Around either cycle the net mean gain averaged over all 
possible strategies is 0; but the net mean per-step change in wealth averaged over all 
possible strategy pairs (agents) is – 0.125 (Table 6).   Over the entire (unique 8-step) 
cycle, the net mean change over all strategy-pairs is exactly –1.0. (Indeed, over 8 steps, 
the net mean change in wealth for all cycles is either –1.0 or 0.)  
3,6,4,8,7,5,1  et. 
m
By definition, a cycle consists of sequence of states attained only once except for the 
return to the initial state. For memory of length m ( τ+  in the case of the THMG) , the 
number of states is the longest possible cycle max 2 1
mL + 2 1m τ+ (or +  in the THMG). In ≡
any cycle composed of fewer states than maxL , the return to the initial state will therefore 
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be persistent. The transition probabilities  a general Tˆ representing 000 000→  and 
111 111→ , which are in principle allowed, in the T MG are alw (I.e., 
0  and 111 111→  are disallowed for m
 in
H ays zero. 
000 00→ τ+ =3; 0000 0000→  and 1111 1111→  
ed foare disallow r m τ+ = s fro e fact that these transitions—
as th
4, etc.)  This follow m th
which are the same e two minimum length cycles—are perfectly persistent (at the 
minimum 'm ). 
Either { } { }et. cyc. or 1,2,4,8,7,6,3,5,1 1,2,3 7,5
 THMG all
,6,4,8, ,1  et. cyc. could hypothetically 
be generated by a crowd of agents in the MG or  sharing strategies that lead to 
identical actions (and a correspondingly fixed “anti-crowd” leading to opposite actions) 
at every time step. In the MG or THMG this could only occur perfectly  if every agent 
shared the same pair of strategies at the maximum Hamming distance. To the extent that 
agents are diverse and with a variety of Hamming distances, the resulting time series is 
less than perfectly anti-persistent. A “superagent” or crowd forms on the basis of good 
prior performance by strategies: Its action for a given ( )tμ is selected by many agents. 
But the minority rules ensures that its wide selection ma it more likely to lose than to 
win. The strategy not being used will be a “minority” strategy which has more chance to 
win (as formally confirmed in [19]). Furthermore, formation of a cohesive “superagent” 
or crowd requires a high probability that many agents will select the same action at a 
given time. This occurs in the so-called “crowded” phase when there are “many” agents 
relative to the number of strategies. 
Thus, the illusion of control effe
kes 
ct is fundamentally due to three ingredients: (i) the 
mi
terms is weaving in and out of traffic—we rarely gain, and often lose by doing so. We 
nority mechanism (an agent or a strategy gains when in the minority and loses 
otherwise); (ii) the selection of strategies by many agents because they were previously in 
the minority, hence less likely to be so in the present; and (iii) the crowding of strategies 
(i.e. few strategies for many agents). In many social and economic activities, we humans 
as agents attempt to maximize value. We often do so by adjusting our present strategy in 
the light what of has previously worked best for the “winners”. Yet this very adjustment 
often proves to have exactly the opposite effect—causing greater losses than if we had 
left well enough alone. A classic everyday example which has been analyzed in these 
 42
would do better sticking to whatever lane we find ourselves in [20]. The negative power 
of this effect is demonstrated by the perverse phenomenon which we have here 
mentioned as well (and discussed in detail in [2]): That in certain games, deliberately 
selecting what appears to be the worst strategy can “paradoxically” enhance gains. 
5 . CYCLE DECOMPOSITION OF MG, MAJG AND $G AND
FINANCIAL TIME SERIES 
 
The MG has been widely discussed as a model market with ( )A t  (or ( )⎤⎦  ) 
equivalent to a price time series (or as the series of signs of change in price). A 
Sgn A t⎡⎣
mechanism for the appearance of pockets of predictability in the MG has been 
demonstrated in [21] and successfully applied to the prediction of a real-world financial 
time series, the NASDAQ composite index (symbol IXIC). In the case of the THMG, the 
appearance of such pockets follows directly from complementary entries of 1 and 0 in Tˆ , 
as for example in eqn. (42). This will happen following any tμ  for which the values of 
( )D tA μ is sufficiently large in conjunction with ( )D tN μ  such that no possible value of 
( )Sgn A t( )U tA ( )NU t (in conjunction with ) can reverse ⎡μ μ ⎤⎣ ⎦
and demonstrates that IC composite IC) similarly shows a 
surprisingly high frequency of such pockets. From the perspective of cycles, we likewise 
anticipate that any time-series whose cycle decomposition demonstrates a significant 
weighting of certain cycles than would be expected by chance should have a higher 
degree of determinism and possibly, too, predictability. We demonstrate this 
phenomenon using the IXIC composite index decomposed into cycles at m=2. Based on 
rank-ordered cycles, we create a toy predictor that forecasts change in direction one step 
ahead. 
 
5.1 C
.  Ref. [21] shows that 
such deterministic sequences occur with greater frequency than one might intuitively 
expect the IX index (IX
YCLE DECOMPOSITION OF MG, M
In the MG/THMG, MAJG/THMAJ and $G/TH$G, agents attempt to predict the next 
tim rket’s “value”, i.e. A(t), 
is simply the sum of all agents’ predictions. It has long been known that in the 
AJG and $G 
e-step in the “market” in which they are participating: The ma
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MG
ill lose 
(i.e ) depe
/THMG, agents cannot in general succeed more often than not—assuming no 
privileging, i.e., all agents have the same memory and access to strategies.  
More precisely, in the regime cm m> , i.e., where the time series is modestly persistent 
and approaching the random limit with increasing m, a majority of agents w
persistently but a small subset will win persistently. However, which agents are winning 
., which strategies they have nds upon the particular configuration (strategy 
composition) of all other agents. Since agents do not know what the initial quenched 
disorder is, agents cannot intelligently choose the ideal strategies for a given such 
disorder. And if all agents could do so, they would thereby reconfigure the initial disorder 
in a potentially infinite recursion to no avail. Likewise, as discussed in Ref.[2], when 
agents are allowed to vary their strategy composition in real-time based on past 
performance, the system as a whole converges to the performance limit of a set of 
random or fixed choice agents.  Thus, even in a regime where some agents do 
consistently win, their winning is a matter of luck, i.e., it follows from the strategies they 
happen to be assigned vis-à-vis the strategies randomly assigned to all other agents. 
On the other hand, in the regime cm m≤ , all agents behave much like random or fixed 
choice agents. That is, no agent can consistently win. Put differently, for cm m>  there is 
information in the history ) in the restricted sense that the ething 
that at least some their good fortune, to make predictions. For 
( )tμ
 agents can use, by 
(of length m re is som
cm m≤  
there is no such information to be extracted by any agent. 
However, a privileged agent with access to a longer history than others will in general 
e able to predict future steps of 
the
the MG, MAJG and $G at a single value of 'm , with the raw cycle weights transformed 
be able to outperform non-privileged agents at all m. Likewise, an outside non-participant 
with access to an arbitrary amount of past history should b
 time series with a better than chance success rate. From this perspective there exists 
information in the time-series at all m. The nature of this information can be highlighted 
by looking at the cycle structure of the time-series and can be tested by implementing 
predictors based on this structure. 
In Figure 4 we presented a side-by-side illustration of the respective cycle structure for 
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into an excess or deficiency relative to that expected in the decomposition of a random 
binary series. The most striking feature of this representation is perhaps not so much their 
differences from each other as their differences from the decomposition of the  
NASDAQ composite index (IXIC): All three games generate series with cycle 
decompositions that are roughly the inverse of the IXIC series decomposition.  
In Figure 11 we present a side-by-side comparison of the relative weights for the MG, 
MAJG and $G at 2 8m≤ ≤  and ' 2m = . The phase transition in the MG is evident in the 
bution for 
an
m that f andom
change in the cycle structure at m = 4. It is important to note that these are ensemble 
averages over many different initial quenched disorder states. The cycle distri
y single initial disorder usually differs substantially from any other and typically 
departs widely fro or a r  series. Thus, for the MG, the closeness of the 
distribution to the random distribution, especially for small m, represents not the typical 
distribution but the many widely varying distributions around a mean. 
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 Figure 11: Relative cycle weights given { } { }, , 2,2,31m S N = for MG, MAJG and $G from left to right and 
2<m<8 from top to bottom. Within each graph, the numbers 1-6 on the x-axis represents the six cycles at 
m’=2, i.e., ( ) { } { } { } { } { } { }( )1,2,3,4,5,6 1,1 , 4,4 , ,3,2 , 1,2,4,3,1≡ 2,3,2 , 1,2,3,1 , 2,4 . The cycles may likewise 
be converted into the outcome + or − following a sequence of directional changes per Table 1. I.e., if the 
last number in the cycle label is odd, the height of the bar represents the probability relative to a random 
series that − follows the series of directional changes; if even that a + follows. 
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5.2 DECOMPOSITION OF THE NASDAQ COMPOSITE INDEX 
We first convert the daily values of the IXIC composite index (IXIC) into a binary 
series of price changes, 1 for up, 0 for down. If the price remains unchanged on two 
successive days, 1 or 0 is entered at random. (Note that this method is much simpler if 
less precise than a trinary series that excludes a necessarily large number of small price 
changes. A decomposition into base three cycles proceeds analogously to a 
decomposition into base two.) For m=1 the possible cycles that may arise are (1,1), (2,2) 
and (1,2,1) et cyc.. For m=2, (1,1), (4,4), (2,3,2) et cyc., (1,2,3,1) et cyc., (2,4,3,2) et cyc. 
and (1,2,4,3,1) et cyc. For m=3 there are 19 (et cyc.) unique cycles. States are denoted by 
1 plus the decimal value of the binary sequence of length m. The cycle structure is 
determined by the method in section III.A. We know from section II.B. that up to a finite 
size error the result is equivalent to an analytic decomposition of a Markov-chain 
representation of the series treated as stationary. (For the MG, a stationary state is always 
eventually attained very rapidly in the THMG, for small m, τ ). The error decreases 
asymptotically with the number of binary data points used. The IXIC in its entirety is 
evidently non-stationary. Furthermore, the bubble and crash of the years ~1998-2002 
depart from a simple linear correction on a visible scale. Thus the larger number of points 
included to create the decomposition the greater the accuracy with respect to finite-size 
error, but the less locally representative it will be. We choose data length equal to one 
trading year (250 trading days). 
We first note that decomposing a time series into cycles—even one as simplified as 
this—provides an immediate impression of structural departures from randomness. For 
the 8700 trading days of the IXIC prior to June 1, 2007, the fraction of up days = 0.56. If 
we randomize a large number of 1’s and 0’s in respective proportions 0.56 and 1-
0.56=0.44, the expected distribution of cycles for m’=2 is shown in Table 7 alongside the 
actual distribution of cycles for the IXIC from this time period. In terms of persistence 
and anti-persistence, the actual IXIC series shows an excess of persistent cycles, i.e., 
(1,1) and (4,4), and a deficit of anti-persistent ones, (2,3,2) in particular. Recent research 
has shown that it is possible to devise working predictors by generating synthetic time 
series from MGs with a variety of parameters such that they are tuned to the 
characteristics of the real-world time-series targeted for prediction[22]. When a real 
 47
series is tuned to a mix of both MG and Majority Games, better results follow than when 
only MG’s are used, since the latter captures primarily anti-persistence at reasonable 
values of m while the Majority Game captures persistence[23]. 
Table 9. m’=2 cycle structure for IXIC binary series and IXIC-biased random binary series  
Cycle 
m’=2 
Frequency (IXIC-Biased) 
Random Series 
Frequency 
IXIC Series 
Frequency Difference 
IXIC-IXIC-Biased Random 
(1,1) 0.16 0.21 +0.05 
(4,4) 0.35 0.40 +0.05 
(2,3,2) 0.12 0.06 -0.06 
(1,2,3,1) 0.09 0.08 -0.01 
(2,4,3,2) 0.15 0.12 -0.03 
(1,2,4,3,1) 0.12 0.12 0 
 
In column 3 of Table 9, we see the actual cycle weightings for the IXIC and in 
column 2 the actual weightings for a random binary sequence with the same upward bias 
as the IXIC. Column 4 provides the difference, thus excluding the net upward drift. Per 
Figure 5 and the distances defined by equation (1), we have 
. By this measure, the IXIC is less 
random than the MG series but more random than the MAJG and $G series. 
$0.270  0.133 d  = 0.118 > 0.028maj IXIC mind d d= > = > =
0.057XAUd =
5.3  DECOMPOSITION OF THE PHILA GOLD AND SILVER INDEX 
By contrast, Figure 12 presents the relatively-weighted cycle decomposition for the 
entire history of the XAU (Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index; December, 1983 through 
February, 2008) with —approximately twice as close to random as the 
IXIC. The XAU shows 49% up days with an annualized buy and hold return of 0.030. A 
cycle predictor based on this decomposition predicts 51% of the daily directional changes 
correctly but yields an annualized return of only .019. Unsurprisingly then, with a series 
much closer to a random one by both the cycle decomposition method and the measure of 
persistence, prediction by the cycle decomposition method is much more difficult and in 
fact fails. 
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  81, 1< 84, 4< 82, 3, 2< 81, 2, 3, 1< 82, 4, 3, 2< 81, 2, 4, 3, 1<
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
81, 1< 84, 4< 82, 3, 2< 81, 2, 3, 1< 82, 4, 3, 2< 81, 2, 4, 3, 1<
XAU
 
Figure 12: Relative-weight cycle decomposition of the Philadelphia Exchange Gold and Silver Index 
(XAU)  
 
5.4 CONSTRUCTING THE PREDICTOR(S) 
The cycle decomposition predictor itself consists of a table regenerated from all =2 
cycles for every possible 250-day (-step) sliding window in sequence along a binary 
series. The cycles are rank-ordered by weight (frequency). The last state prior to the 
prediction day consists of 1 plus the last m days of binary data converted to decimal form. 
The predictor simply consists of the next state cycle following the present state. The 
prediction is the first number (1 or 0) in the binary representation of the state. If the 
present state is represented in more than one cycle, the cycle with the larger weight is 
used, consistent with a 0th-order approximation by a wholly deterministic process (The 
rare persisting ties are settled by a fair coin toss. The dependency predictor is constructed 
similarly. The only procedural difference is that decimally-converted last state prior to 
the prediction date identifies a unique member from the set of dependencies, hence 
generates a unique prediction.)  
'm
We start using days 1-250 predicting day 251 and then slide the 250 day window 
forward by one day and recalculate the decomposition (and dependencies), so that days 2-
251 predict day 252. The process is repeated through all days of data (minus the initial 
250) and the percentage of correct predictions is calculated. These results are compared 
to a “buy and hold” strategy which is equivalent to always predicting 1.  
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We find that even for so simple a cycle predictor the fraction of its correct predictions 
is ~0.58 which on the face of it appears significantly better than what may attained by 
chance and better than a “prediction” consisting of “always assume the next day’s change 
will be positive”, i.e. a “buy and hold” strategy.  
One might naïvely use the t-test and the binomial distribution to calculate p ≤ 0.00008 
for the 0.58 fraction of correct predictions. But this value is not likely to be accurate for 
the same reason that Table 9 demonstrates such large departures from a random 
structure, hence Gaussian distribution: The underlying distribution of up and down days 
results from short-term (a few days of ) internal dependencies as discussed for example in 
Ref. [10] with respect to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We use these dependencies 
to obtain a more realistic and empirical “non-Gaussian p” that reflects the exact 
distribution of the one real IXIC time-series available to us. 
The method we employ is as follows. First, consider what is required to obtain from 
simulations a (Gaussian) p-value for 0.58 correct predictions: Flip a 0.56 heads-biased 
coin 8700 times, many times over, to generate a large number of 8700-bit synthetic 
sequences (Heads = 1, tails = 0.). These sequences are memoryless (m= 0): each bit is 
independent of any other. Then count the number of such sequences for which the mean 
is ≥ 0.58 and divide by 8700. This reproduces the p-value generated by the binomial 
distribution.  
Second consider that the real series shows tendencies toward persistence or anti-
persistence (perhaps both in different regions and even if towards persistence overall—as 
the 0.56 mean would imply). Then these dependencies will tend to perpetuate themselves 
with some probability (thus tending to perpetuate even further). This yields fat-tailed 
distributions that are similar to financial market returns where extreme events are more 
likely than under the Gaussian assumption of complete independence of price changes. It 
likewise causes more than the expected number of runs of certain shorter lengths (two- or 
three-bit states, say, and beyond the overall 0.56 + bias) and fewer of others. (See Ref. 
[24] for detailed studies of this phenomenon in terms of market “drawdowns”.)   
We characterize such dependencies at the m-bit level for a range of m as follows. m=0 
is defined as no dependency: There is simply a 0.56 probability at every time-step that the 
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next bit will = 1 (and a 0.44 probability that it will = 0). To determine the m=1 
dependency, determine the proportion of instances (out of a total of 8700-1) in which 0 is 
followed by 1 and in which 1 is followed by 1. (This is equivalent to recasting the series 
in paths of length m+1=2, converting to digital representation { }0,1,2,3
1 01 1 and 1 1 11 3→ ≡ = → ≡ =
and finding the 
proportion of the two odd values, 1 and 3: 0 ) Under a 
Gaussian assumption, the frequency (probability) of either odd value (relative to their 
even alternatives) would simply be 0.56. But in fact the probability of a 1 appearing is 
dependent on the value of the preceding bit:  p(1|0)=0.48; p(1|1)=0.63. This is the 
simplest demonstration of persistence in the IXIC. Over 8699 days the departure from the 
Gaussian expectation is significant at greater than 6 standard deviations as shown in 
Figure 13. 
- +
history
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p Probability of + following each m=1 history
0.48
0.63
 
Figure 13:  The probabilities that an up day will follow a down day (–) or an up day (+) in the IXIC based 
on nearly the entire daily history (8700 days) of price changes. The solid black line at 0.56 represents the 
overall proportion of + price changes hence the Gaussian expectation of +. The two dashed lines above and 
below represent departures of 3 standard deviations from 0.56. 
A similar analysis based on the four possible two-day prior histories is shown in 
Figure 14. All four histories ({ } { }00,01,10,11 , , ,≡ −− −+ +− + + ) are associated with 
succeeding probabilities for 1 (+) that again depart from the Gaussian expectation of 0.56 
at a significance of greater than 3 standard deviations. (This analysis is similar to that 
performed by Zhang in [10], but we use it here not to argue against the efficient market 
hypothesis but as a practical means of assessing non-Gaussian probabilities.)  
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Figure 14: The probabilities that an up day will follow each of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , or− − − + + − + + in the IXIC 
based on nearly the entire daily history (8700 days) of price changes. The solid black line at 0.56 represents 
the overall proportion of + price changes, hence the Gaussian expectation of +. The two dashed lines above 
and below represent departures of 3 standard deviations from 0.56. 
As longer histories are used, the individual probabilities in general depart from the 
Gaussian expectation at lower significance levels and the alternation between <0.56 and 
>0.56 based on the immediate prior bit attenuates greatly.  Most of the simple 
dependency structure appears to be captured by the probabilities that follow a two-bit 
history. 
With these empirically-determined dependencies create a large number of synthetic, 
non-Gaussian time series in the following way: Generate a random two-bit initial state 
and generate the succeeding +1 or –1 with the properly associated probability, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1| 00 0.501, 1| 01 0.611, 1|10 0.468, 1|11 0.621p p p p= = = = . Shift forward 1 step 
and repeat 8698 times. As a result, the appropriate degree of persistence is captured in 
each replica of the original. Many more such replicas show a 0.58 net +1 imbalance or 
greater than in a Gaussian simulation while the overall expectation value for 1 remains 
0.56.  
From these replicas we may compute a more realistic p-value for the toy predictor 
(which was likewise based on m’=2). In this case, we obtain p ≤ 0.00014 based on 10,000 
replicas of the 8700 day series.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
We have presented two tools for analyzing binary series—persistence and the cycle 
decomposition and for generating predictions of future binary data points based on prior 
data. Both methods arise as a natural means for teasing apart the statistical structure of 
the time-series generated by MG, MAJG and $G all of which were designed to capture 
certain aspects of real-world markets. When the underlying structure of a system 
generating a time-series is known, and especially when it is known to be Markovian, the 
cycle decomposition is analytically exact and provides an explicit portrait of the type and 
degree of determinism embodied in the system. The microscopic performance of agents 
and their strategies may be studied by examining their deterministic performance around 
each cycle. Even peculiar effects such as the illusion of control in MG—an illusion found 
commonly in many real world attempt to control and predict—can be understood in terms 
of the different kinds of behavior displayed as a system traverses different cycles. 
As we have shown, it is possible to generate predictors based on the cycle 
decomposition which under certain circumstances yields efficient real-world results, even 
when the predictors are extremely simple, even naïve. One intuitively sensible such 
circumstance is that the series being predicted departs from randomness in a way that he 
predictors can exploit. Indeed, both the cycle decomposition method and the calculation 
of the persistence of a series provide measures of to what extent a series does depart from 
randomness.  
Both the measure of persistence and the cycle decomposition method require the 
selection of a memory length 'm  at which to perform the analyses. We do not here report 
on the results of the next evident step, namely the analysis of empirical series at multiple 
'  (since the natural '  is unknown or may not exist). However, as an example, it is 
generally true that series that are predictable using these methods show consistently non-
random values for persistence at multiple ' , while unpredictable ones do. 
m m
m
For example, as shown in Figure 15, even when the IXIC is made linearly stationary 
(to eliminate the upward bias), the persistence parameter shows a significant 
deviation from the expected value 0.5 for a random series at all values , and 
with a mean over these ten values of 0.52 ± 0.004. By contrast, the linearly stationary 
IXICP
1 ' 10m< <
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XAUP shows no such deviation from the random expectation, with a mean over the same 
range of exactly 0.50 ± 0.008. 
 
2 4 6 8 10
m’
0.46
0.48
0.52
0.54
P Persistence  at 1§ m’§10 for IXIC& XAU
XAU < P > =0.50
IXIC < P>=0.52
 
Figure 15:   Persistence measure P  for the IXIC and XAU at for values of 1 ≤ m’ ≤ 10.   (Recall that P is 
the fraction of binary sequences of length m’ within a series which if followed by 1 at a given appearance, 
will be followed by 1 again at its next appearance, averaged over all appearances and all possible sequences 
of that same length.)  
Many of the results pertaining to real-world time-series in this paper relate to the 
extensive literature on “technical analysis” to predict financial time series. Technical 
analysis may be defined as methods of predicting price changes or change of direction 
based chiefly on prior prices, sometimes also on open interest an/or on volume. For many 
years, technical analysis was exclusively the domain of amateur and professional traders 
and academic proponents of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) presumed that 
prediction on such a basis was a priori impossible. More recent statistical studies have 
demonstrated both that certain forms of technical analysis (especially those that avoid the 
dangers of excess data-mining) may indeed be profitable; and that the profitability of any 
given method has declined over time, especially since the advent of rigorous computer-
based quantitative algorithms of ever-increasing speed and sophistication. Both points are 
reviewed in [25], while [26] demonstrates how technical analysis has incorporated 
statistical inference with the largely intuitive pattern-recognition methods of twenty and 
more years ago.  As more methods of increasing complexity are introduced into a market, 
that market becomes progressively more efficient. The remaining marginal inefficiency 
therefore becomes that much more difficult to exploit, and can readily reach the point 
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where (for an indefinite period of time, if not permanently) the costs associated with 
extracting any residual potential gain remain greater than the gain itself. It is also the case 
that not all markets are equally non-exploitable. Thus, for many years, the Standard and 
Poor’ Index of 500 American stocks as well as the precious metal markets have been 
considered exemplars of efficiency beyond practical exploitation by technical  methods. 
By contrast, staple commodity markets have until very recently largely remained the 
province of old-fashioned floor traders with a significant degree of inefficiency to be 
exploited. P, the measure of persistence we apply to real-world data may provide a simple 
measure of how likely it is that technical measures will succeed, or put more precisely, 
how slim is the marginal inefficiency. The contrast in P shown in Figure 15 suggests that 
the precious metals market is highly efficient but that(until more recently) the IXIC has 
not been. 
The decline in profitability over time of a given method is strikingly demonstrated in 
our own discussion of a cycle-decomposition predictor (see Figure 9) as is another point: 
That when a given method’s returns decline to the level where cost exceeds benefit, other 
more sophisticated improvements may (but surely only for a time) restore profitability. 
Many prior studies have indicated the presence of linear price-change correlations in 
high-frequency financial data e.g., ref.s [27][28][29][30], but not in low-frequency data 
(hourly, daily, weekly, etc.) The presence of linear correlations suggests that persistence 
ought to be in general higher in higher-frequency data than lower. Figure 16 illustrates 
this for the US Dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rate for October 1, 1992 (made linearly 
stationary over the day). It demonstrates a meanP = 0.55, much higher than for the 
IXIC and very far from random—consistent with the observation that foreign exchange 
markets remain susceptible to technical trading methods [25]. Note that for m’ = 10, 
patterns of up to 210 = 2048 binary bits show a significantly greater tendency to repeat 
than to not, implying a degree of non-linear and multi-step correlation above and beyond 
any linear correlations. 
/USD DM
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P Persistence at 1 ¥ m ¥ 10 for USDêDM FX
 
Figure 16:  Persistence at m between 1 and 10 for high-frequency (tick) data for the USD/DM foreign 
exchange rate on Oct. 1, 1992 (~6500 data points) 
Similarly, the cycle decomposition shows d / 0.27USD DM = , equivalent to MAJ
' 2m =
d . If one 
imagines it were possible to trade without cost long or short on any tick, an  cycle 
decomposition predictor would yield 61% correct choices of direction and a one-day gain 
of 1.61 versus 58% up-ticks with a buy and hold gain of .005.,A one-day gain of 1.61 
translates into an annualized return of > 1051)—the excessively large number reflecting 
the absence of the enormous trading and other costs associated with such rapid theoretical 
trading). Down-ticks are in general much larger than up-ticks; the cycle decomposition 
predictor tacitly accounts for this discrepancy in efficient fashion such that the ~3 
percentage point improvement in directional prediction translates to a very much more 
impressive gain. 
Similar consistency with respect to the configuration of the respective cycle 
decompositions and pseudo-linear distances from random are found across many high-
frequency and daily price indices. This fact is consistent with the ability of a persistence 
filter to enhance the efficiency of a cycle-decomposition predictor as discussed above. It 
would be valuable to conduct a more wide-ranging survey of various time-series, both 
real-world and synthetic to quantify the reliability of these measures and the predictors 
described. 
We have here concentrated upon cycles and persistence as defined for binary series. 
While computationally more intense, it is straightforward mathematically to extend these 
measures to trinary, quaternary, etc. series. Preliminary studies demonstrate greatly 
improved predictive power, for example, when parsing real-world price changes into 
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three rather than two domains (i.e., { }− instead of { },0, ,+ + − ) and thus generating trinary 
series and the associated measure of persistence. 
We look forward to extending and reporting on the application range of these 
relatively simple and intuitive measures, for analyzing and characterizing time-series as a 
whole, for characterizing different regimes within time-series, and for generating 
prediction methods. 
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